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1 Introduction
In April 2006, the French Government created a new type of labor contract targeting youth. This contract
was named the Contrat Première Embauche (rst employment contract), or CPE for short. The main
purpose of the CPE was to reduce the cost of administrative procedures related to dismissals for jobs
occupied by young workers. Student unions militated against this proposal, and huge numbers of young
people demonstrated out in the streets and occupied faculties. Some of their leaders became media
icons. To many observers, most of them foreigners, these demonstrations were a pure illustration of
the ideological bias of the French society as a whole: students demanding and obtaining the shelving of
legislation that was supposed to improve their economic perspectives.1 We consider another explanation
to the behavior of the French students. This explanation is based on housing market imperfections and
their impacts on the willingness of people to adopt a legislation that reduces job security.
The housing market is very far from the typical neoclassical market. The permanent or temporary
exchange of durable goods involves long-term contracts. In the rental case, the owner temporarily transfers
his property right to the tenant against rent payment. In the mortgage case, the bank nances (part of)
the purchase of the house in exchange for mortgage reimbursement. The landlord and the bank have to be
able to recover the property in case of rent or mortgage default. This is the enforcement problem identied
by Djankov et al (2003). Legal systems heavily regulate contract enforcements in the housing market.
Such regulations generate costs that are lost for the owner and tenant or for the bank and borrower. In
turn, the magnitude of such costs a¤ects lenders and dwellers who become more circumspect as to the
borrowers or tenants income security. In this context, getting a secured job not only insures against
labor market-specic risk but also facilitates access to the housing market. A key implication is that the
need for job protection increases with procedural formalism, that is with the degree of housing market
regulation (HMR).
We proceed in three steps. In Section 2, we present a set of facts that motivate our thesis. At the micro
level, job security improves youth emancipation and household ownership. This holds true for a variety
of controls, including age and wage income. At the macro level, we use the procedural formalism index
of Djankov et al (2003) to measure the degree of HMR, and we use the OECD EPL index to quantify
the strictness of EPL. These indices are positively correlated in the cross-section of OECD countries. We
use dynamic panel data covering 15 OECD countries over the period 1950-2000. Data are averaged over
5 years, and the panel is balanced. We show that the correlation is robust to country xed e¤ects, time
e¤ects, and to the consideration of inertia in the strictness of EPL. We also provide evidence of causal
e¤ects: EPL responds to lagged HMR, while neither current nor lagged EPL a¤ects HMR.
We then develop, in Section 3, a model to explain why HMR should inuence EPL. The idea is to
capture some form of social cohesion behind EPL. We want to understand why a young person can be
in favor of EPL despite the fact that job protection is detrimental to job creation. The framework is a
static matching model with endogenous job creation and job destruction. EPL determines ring costs,
thereby increasing job stability but decreasing the matching probability. We consider ex-ante risk neutral
agents. The demand for EPL does not build on exogenous risk aversion, but stems from endogenous risk
1Economic gains were not so obvious. Cahuc and Carcillo (2006) focus on the case of the Contrat Nouvelle Embauche,
an employment contract very close to the CPE. Compared to short-term contracts, the CNE reduces the probability of
obtaining a regular job. Depending on the discount rate, unemployed welfare may decrease with the CNE even though the
unemployment rate goes down.
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aversion originated by HMR. In our setting, individuals only derive utility from housing. To buy a house,
a person takes a mortgage pledging his future income. HMR is modeled as a foreclosure cost for the bank.
In case of default, the bank expects to recover only part of its investment. Banks only lend to employed
agents and expect some losses when the borrower loses his job. Strengthening EPL lowers the default
probability and reduces the expected loss for the bank. Competitive banks o¤er lower mortgage prices
as a result. The preferred EPL parameter results from the following trade-o¤: on the negative side, an
increase in EPL may deteriorate the employment probability, but on the positive side it decreases the
borrowing cost. We show that the demand for EPL is an increasing function of the degree of HMR.
In Section 4, we extend our model in several directions and discuss various implications. We rst
account for social housing or other alternative housing arrangements like coresidence with parents. Such
a type of housing supply raises the returns to EPL as it makes unemployment less painful. The second
extension examines housing unemployment insurance. Insurance coverage is very limited: empirical
studies show that high-risk borrowers are typically excluded from insurance coverage. The third extension
is motivated by the dramatic increase in the use of short-term contracts in European countries. That
increase partly results from the strictness of EPL on long-term contracts, but also from more exible
regulations on the use of temporary jobs. Boeri and Garibaldi (2009) argue that the increase in the
supply of short-term jobs has reduced unemployment, but in a way that dissatises European citizens.
Our model can explain this paradox: unemployed individuals may favor taxes on the use of short-term
contracts despite such taxes lowering the odds of employment. Solving the unemployment problem at the
expense of job stability may turn against the policy maker in that case. The fourth extension extends
our analysis of HMR to regulations that limit access to mortgage credit. Such regulations weaken the
political support for job protection as they reduce the return on job security induced by a better loan.
The fth extension investigates the scope for reverse causality, from EPL to HMR. We complete the basic
model: individuals face two di¤erent default risks, and they are covered by a housing insurance obtained
at the expense of the bank. Dispute resolution implies that the loss for the bank is larger than the gain
for the defaulting person. We show that EPL has an ambiguous impact on the social demand for HMR.
Finally, we revisit the 2006 French CPE events and argue that the timing of the reform was typically
misconceived. The Government should have rst reformed the housing market and then introduced the
labor market reform. The opposite occurred: a housing market reform took place six months after the
failure of the labor market reform.
This paper adds to the growing literature on the positive analysis of employment protection. This
literature aims at understanding the degree of employment protection specic to each country. As ex-
plained by Botero et al (2004), labor market regulation has three explanations: rent-seeking, the legal
origins of the judicial system, and market failures.
According to the rent-seeking argument, EPL maximizes the rent situation of insider workers who
benet from a long-term contract.2 In this approach, individuals are reduced to their selsh interests.
They have no family, and especially no children or wife who may su¤er from labor market rigidity.
The political insider model emphasized by Saint-Paul (2001) predicts strong intergenerational conicts
over EPL. However, such conicts are not obvious when one examines the CPE events. Our paper
takes a complementary road as it focuses on young nonemployed individuals. Doing so, we argue that
2However, workers in dying industries/jobs may have preferences very similar to those of the unemployed. See Saint-Paul
(2002).
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intergenerational conicts are not so strong over EPL: young workers are more willing to obtain a rent
or a mortgage, which tends to increase their demand for job protection above the point that maximizes
their employment probability.
The legal origins argument considers that the regulation of labor depends on the fundamental char-
acteristics of the judicial system (Botero et al, 2004). Common-law judicial systems lower the need for
regulation as they are characterized by the importance of decision-making by juries, independent judges,
and the emphasis on judicial discretion as opposed to code. In a more general interpretation, this ar-
gument hinges on the idea that predetermined traits of a society mostly explain the set of institutions
that rule the country: the legal origins, but also cultural factors like machismo, the dominant religion, or
civic attitudes (see Algan and Cahuc, 2006, 2009). Our paper takes a complementary approach whereby
job protection emerges as a rational response to a regulated housing market. Of course, cultural factors
simultaneously a¤ect regulation on the labor and housing markets. However, the dynamic data we use in
Section 2 allow us to control for country xed e¤ects and identify a statistically signicant relationship
between HMR and EPL.
The market failure argument analyses EPL as a way to improve welfare in the context of market
imperfections. Blanchard and Tirole (2008) for instance examine the optimal design of unemployment
coverage in light of various market failures. This part of the literature highlights the role played by
institutions that are not directly related to job dismissals. Such institutions can be substitutable or
complementary to EPL. For instance, unemployment insurance and job protection are substitutable
because they both cover employees against unemployment risk (see Boeri et al, 2003), while product
market regulations and job protection are complementary because job protection secures the share of
rents accruing to employees (see Kugler and Pica, 2006). Our paper relies on this literature by pointing
out the need to focus on policy complementarity at the time of reform. Our innovation consists in
highlighting the role of the housing market.
The idea whereby housing market imperfections originate risk aversion thereby creating a social de-
mand for job protection relies on the literature on consumption commitments. Consumption commit-
ments allow the price of consumption goods to be reduced. However, commitments must be honored,
thus creating risk aversion. Chetty (2008) argues that unemployment benets raise durations through
a liquiditye¤ect for households who cannot smooth consumption perfectly typically those with low
assets or mortgage repayments. Turning to welfare implications, he concludes that the optimal replace-
ment rate is above 50% of the former wage, a ratio that is higher than previous studies found. In the
same vein, Postlewaite et al (2008) argue that consumption commitments induce workers to sign labor
contracts that possibly involve an unemployment stage. As in those papers, risk aversion is endogenous in
our paper. Beyond our focus on national legislations and international comparisons, our paper innovates
by letting the degree of risk aversion vary with housing market regulation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents micro and macro stylized facts.
Section 3 introduces our model and discusses the positive impact of housing market regulations on the
willingness to secure jobs. Section 4 discusses several aspects of the model and extends it in various
directions. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Empirical evidence
This section presents empirical evidence motivating our analysis. We rst discuss the microeconomic
evidence that relates job security to housing access. We then examine within and between country
correlations between EPL strictness and the degree of HMR.
2.1 Microeconomic evidence
In this subsection, we argue that job security facilitates access to housing.
The rst piece of evidence comes from the study of coresidence rates between parents and o¤spring
for various age groups. Coresidence rates after 20 or after 25 vary considerably between countries. Such
rates are typically very high in Mediterranean European countries, with an Italian leader and a French
exception. By contrast, they are much lower in Nordic countries and in the UK. Part of this heterogeneity
reects cultural di¤erences. However, economic performance via its impact on youth unemployment and
youth job insecurity may have an impact on youth emancipation. Becker et al (2009) use Italian individual
data on perceived job security. Controlling for income level, they show that unemployment and youth
job insecurity are negatively correlated with the probability of emancipation.
The second piece of evidence comes from studies on home ownership probability. Serrano-Diaz (2005a)
uses European data from the European Community Household Panel and tries to explain household
probability of home ownership. He builds an index of income volatility and shows that the probability of
home ownership decreases with income volatility. Probit regressions control for country xed e¤ects and
for individual variables like age and education, but also wage and nancial resources. The latter controls
are important as income volatility may be correlated with income level.
The third piece of evidence relates to the determinants of the risk of mortgage default. Deng et al
(1996) on US data shows that unemployment episodes increase the default probability. Eichholtz (1995)
focuses on the Netherlands and shows that regional employment stability is correlated with regional rates
of default. Serrano-Diaz (2005b) uses ECHP data and considers the delinquency risk rather than the
default probability. He shows that household delinquency probability increases with income volatility
as well as after an unemployment episode. Estimates control for sample selection bias, because the
distribution of unobserved characteristics among households who borrowed generally di¤ers from the
distribution of characteristics among the whole population. The number of delinquency episodes is low:
the mean delinquency rate is approximately 2.5% in the whole sample. It suggests that banks severely
screen the potential borrowers, and successfully reject high-risk borrowers. In all likelihood, owners do
the same prior to renting.
2.2 Macroeconomic evidence
In this subsection, we focus on the correlation between the degree of HMR and the strictness of EPL.
EPL covers a variety of regulations a¤ecting workersdismissals like procedural requirements, notice
and severance pay requirements, penalties for unfair dismissals, regulations to the use of temporary work
and short-term contracts, specic regulations applying to collective dismissals. The OECD provides three
synthetic indices depicting the strictness of regulations in three complementary areas: the protection of
regular jobs, the use of temporary workers and short-term contracts, and the specic rules applying to
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collective dismissals. These indices are aggregated within two general indices: EPL1 equals one half the
index on regular jobs plus one half the index on the use of short-term contracts. EPL2 equals 5/6 EPL1
plus 1/6 the index on collective redundancies. EPL1 and EPL2 are only available for OECD countries.
EPL1 has three observations per country (end 1980s, end 1990s, and 2003). EPL2 has two observations
(end 1990s and 2003). Using the OECD methodology, Allard (2005) provides and complements EPL2
for each year between 1950 and 2006. We use her index hereafter.
HMR covers the rental and the mortgage markets. We are interested in the subset of regulations that
weaken property rights. Chiuri and Japelli (2003) focus on two measures of the cost of foreclosure in case
of buyers default. Those measures are the mean duration of housing mortgage foreclosure proceedings
(in months) and the average legal expenses in percentage of the price of the mortgaged house. These
measures have two main shortcomings. First, they do not directly measure regulations, but some of
their potential implications. Foreclosure expenses and duration are endogenous. Second, they are only
available for a restricted number of countries, and there is a single observation per country.
Therefore, we consider two indices of procedural formalism that have been built by Djankov et al
(2003). They focus on two disputes: the eviction of a tenant who does not pay the rent, and the
collection of a bounced check. In both cases, the index is built from several sub-indices that describe
the exact procedure used by litigants and courts: the required degree of professionalism of lawyers and
judges, the preeminence of written versus oral presentation at each stage of the procedure, the need for
legal justication in the complaint and in the judgment, the rules of evidence, the appeal procedure,
engagement formalities that must be observed before a party is legally bound by the court proceedings,
and the number of independent procedural actions. Djankov et al show that higher procedural formalism
predicts longer duration of dispute resolution, lower enforceability of contracts, higher corruption, as well
as lower honesty, consistency, and fairness of the system. The tenant eviction index directly applies to
the rental market. The bounced check index is not directly related to the housing market. However, it
can be used as a global measure of the legal di¢ culties to recover a debt, whether on the product or
mortgage markets. In the 2003 paper, both indices were only available for a year. Balas et al (2009)
extend the coverage and the indices are available on a yearly basis between 1950 and 2000 for 40 developed
and developing countries. We follow them and consider the indices for the 15 OECD countries of their
sample.3
The tenant eviction index and the bounced check index are almost perfectly correlated. The correlation
coe¢ cient is .93. Hereafter we only focus on the tenant eviction index, having in mind that the index
captures more than the regulation on the rental market.
3The 15 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.
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Figure 1: The relationship between HMR and EPL, 1995-2000. The variables have been averaged over
ve years and centered around their period means. The straight line is the least-square regression.
variables mean st.dev min max
overall 0 .96 -1.98 1.84
EPL between .86 -1.27 1.29
within .46 -1.32 .98
overall 0 1.01 -2.16 2.08
HMR between 1.00 -1.64 1.76
within .31 -1.32 1.09
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
As institutional variables do not change frequently, we average data over ve-year periods. This leaves
us with 10 observations for 15 countries. We substrate the period mean to each observation to purge the
data from trends and aggregate shocks that a¤ect all countries simultaneously. Table 1 shows that there
is substantial variation in the dataset. The standard deviation is one fourth of the maximum variation
for each index. Table 1 also shows that there is more volatility to exploit in the cross-section dimension
than in the time dimension. However, the volatility is su¢ ciently large within countries to apply dynamic
panel data analysis.
Figure 1 displays the correlation between the EPL index and the HMR index over the period 1995-
2000. The correlation is positive. However, the correlation between HMR and EPL in the cross-section
of countries does not prove that HMR and EPL are e¤ectively related with each other. The correlation
may be spurious, reecting country-specic factors that simultaneously a¤ect HMR and EPL.
To account for country-specic factors, we exploit the dynamic panel structure of the data and run
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xed e¤ects regressions. Table 2 shows that the EPL and HMR indices are positively correlated. Table
2 also suggests that this correlation reects causality from HMR to EPL.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
HMRt .65*** .37*** -.08
(.05) (.10) (.10)
HMRt 1 .25** .18** .30**
(.11) (.08) (.15)
EPLt 1 .76*** .76*** .89***
(.07) (.07) (.09)
Fixed E¤ects no yes yes yes yes
R2 .48 .06 .64 .64
No obs 150 135 135 135 135
Sargan .26
Hansen .19
AR(2) .58
Table 2: The impact of HMR on EPL with panel data. The dependent variable is the EPL index. Robust
standard errors in brackets. Column a reports the OLS estimates when we pool the data. Columns b to d report
xed e¤ects estimates and the within R2. Column e reports two-step system-GMM estimates. Estimations were
made using the Stata command xtabond2. The number of GMM-style instruments was reduced using the option
collapse. Lines Sargan and Hansen provide the P-values for the Sargan and Hansen tests of overidentifying
restrictions. The null is that instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Line AR(2) is the P-value for the
Arellano-Bond second-order auto-correlation test. The null is that errors in the di¤erence regression do not
exhibit second-order correlation. Signicance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
We proceed in four steps.
Column a reports pooled estimates. It conrms the visual guess displayed by Figure 1. The R2 is
remarkably high, given that the HMR index is the only explicative variable. However, as explained below,
the correlation may be driven by country-specic factors. It may also be due to strong autoregressive
components in the dynamic processes of the EPL and HMR indices.
Column b reports xed e¤ects estimates. Fixed e¤ects allow country-specic factors that do not
change over time to be controlled. This includes the legal origins of the judicial system, ideological
biases, but also cultural factors that change very slightly over time. Column b shows that the correlation
between EPL and HMR is robust to such xed e¤ects, though the magnitude of the parameter associated
with HMR is cut by half.
Columns c and d account for the dynamics of the dependent and explicative variables. As expected
from the measure of an institution, the strictness of EPL is very sluggish: the estimated parameter
associated with the lagged dependent variable is .76. Consideration of the lagged dependent variable
lowers the magnitude of the relationship between HMR and EPL. The parameter amounts to one-third of
the value displayed in column a. However, it is still signicant at 5%. Columns c and d display another
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piece of information. The current level of EPL is a¤ected by the past level of HMR and not by its current
level. This result is in favor of a causal relationship from HMR to EPL.
To investigate the causal relationship from HMR to EPL, we run an auxiliary regression. We try to
explain HMR as a function of current and lagged EPL. The following relationship is obtained:
HMRit = bai   :04
(:04)
EPLit + :04
(:04)
EPLit 1 + :86
(:10)
HMRit 1 + b"it (1)
where robust squared errors are in brackets. The parameters associated with EPL variables have a very
small magnitude, and they are nonsignicant at any reasonable level. These estimates conrm the view
whereby HMR causes EPL, while HMR does not seem to cause EPL.
Column e reports system-GMM estimates (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The xed e¤ects estimator is
biased in nite sample because the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term. Formally,
the model is written as follows:
EPLit = a1EPLit 1 + a2HMRit 1 +"it (2)
EPLit = a1EPLit 1 + a2HMRit 1 + "it (3)
The model has two components: the di¤erence and level submodels. In both components, the lagged
dependent variable is correlated with the error terms and must be instrumented. In addition, HMRit 1
may be correlated with "it 1, which also requires an instrumenting strategy. In the absence of good
instruments, the set of instruments only contains lagged regressors. In the di¤erence submodel, the
di¤erenced lagged EPL index is instrumented by past levels of the index (from EPLit 2), while the
lagged EPL index is instrumented by past di¤erences of the index in the level submodel (from EPLit 1).
This generates a large number of instruments in GMM-style. The set of instruments is nally reduced
by collapsing the matrix of GMM-style instruments to avoid the overinstrumenting bias.4 Similarly,
the regressors HMRit 1 and HMRit 1 are instrumented by their own lags. The model is estimated
by two-step GMM, while reported squared errors feature Windmeijer correction to correct for individual
heteroskedasticity, arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation within individuals, and downward bias in squared
errors in nite samples.
GMM estimates conrm xed e¤ects estimates, which suggests that the endogeneity bias is not very
large in the xed e¤ects regressions. Overall, HMR a¤ects EPL with a ve-year delay. This e¤ect is
robust to the consideration of country-specic e¤ects, time e¤ects, and to the introduction of the lagged
dependent variable among the regressors. Quantitatively, increasing the HMR index by one-standard
deviation leads to a one-fourth standard deviation increase in the EPL index.
In the next section, we present a model of the housing and labor markets that can explain why the
degree of regulation on the housing market can a¤ect the willingness of people to secure their jobs.
3 The demand for EPL with HMR
This section introduces a model of the labor and housing markets that features a social demand for EPL
at given HMR. We consider a static economy peopled by identical individuals. We focus on the demand
4The number of instruments increases with the time index of each observation. The total number of instruments is
quadratic in the number of periods as a result. Collapsing allows such a number to be reduced, while exploiting the same
information displayed by the dataset (see Roodman, 2006).
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of those agents for job protection before entering market activities such as searching for a job, working,
and enjoying housing consumption. We examine this demand under the veil of ignorance to disentangle
our analysis from papers focusing on the insider-outsider dichotomy. All individuals start unemployed
and we study their preferences over EPL prior to knowing whether they will be employed or not. This
assumption has various advantages. First, we abstract from vested interests and rent protection that have
been discussed so far. Second, EPL is e¢ cient in a second-best environment characterized by various
forms of market imperfections. Third, we avoid the general critique addressed to political economy models
of labor market institutions: prime-aged people do not vote against the interests of their own children in
our approach. By focusing on the welfare of a (young) nonemployed and nonhoused person, we capture
the social cohesion relating job protection that we observe in many European countries.
The model has two blocks. In the labor market block, employment opportunities and job loss probabil-
ity decrease with an index that captures the EPL e¤ects. The housing market block features imperfections
on the credit market. The only purpose of income is to buy housing units. Once an individual has ob-
tained a job, he borrows money from the bank. The mortgage is repaid at the end of the period if the
individual did not get red. In case of job loss, we assume individuals default. The bank only recov-
ers a share of the mortgaged housing, while the remaining share is lost. The proportion that is lost is
exogenous, and measures the degree of housing market imperfections.
The model we present can be reinterpreted to analyze the rental market. In that case, substitute
owner for bank and rent for mortgage.
Formally, the model is as follows: we assume a unit mass of homogenous risk neutral agents living
one period and starting the period as unemployed.
Timing. In a rst stage, EPL is set. In a second stage, households search for a job. They nd it with
probability m. Once the job is found, the wage w is determined. We normalize unemployment benets to
zero. In a third stage, households buy/rent housing on the basis of their employment contract. The unit
price of the rent/buy is R. It is endogenous. To simplify, housing consumption is the only purpose of
income. In a fourth stage, the productivity of each job unfolds making some jobs potentially unprotable.
We model the EPL as a dismissal cost. Therefore, the probability that a job is not destroyed is given
by p and is increasing with the strictness of EPL. Only those who stay employed pay the mortgage, and
benet from housing consumption.
The model must be solved backward. We now present it in greater details.
Labor market. There is a continuum of rms. Each rm corresponds to a single job slot, which can
be active or inactive. Turning active costs c > 0. Vacant jobs and unemployed workers meet according
to a matching technology. Let  be the ratio of vacant jobs to unemployed workers. The probability
of receiving a job o¤er is  (), while the probability of recruiting a worker is  () =, with  (0) = 0,
 (1) = 1, 0 > 0, 00 < 0, and 0 (0) = 1. The strict concavity implies that  () = is strictly decreasing,
while the Inada-type condition ensures that lim
!0
 () = = 1 by lHôpitals rule.5
Once the worker is hired, the productivity of the job is revealed. The rm chooses whether to continue
the employment relationship or not. The productivity of the job results from a random draw from the
distribution F over the support ( 1;1).
EPL strictness is captured as follows. The ring cost t  0 is a pure loss to the rm. We do not
consider redundancy premia paid to the worker as they are typically low with respect to the wage. The
5These assumptions are compatible with the urn-ball matching technology.
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rationale for such a neglect is a non-formalized moral hazard problem.
We assume an exogenously xed wage w. Appendix A considers alternative wage settings. What
matters is not the way the wage is set but rather that the wage cannot be changed ex-post, that is once
the productivity of the job is known. At wage w and EPL t, operating prot is y   w. The worker is
dismissed if and only if y   w <  t. Therefore, expected prot is
(w; t) =
Z 1
w t
(y   w)dF (y)  F (w   t)t (4)
with
@ (w; t)
@w
=   [1  F (w   t)] (5)
@ (w; t)
@t
=  F (w   t) (6)
Under free entry,
c =
 ()

 (w; t) (7)
This equality holds if and only if  (w; t)  c. Tightness decreases with wage and ring cost. It follows that
both the job-nding probability m (t) =  () and the job destruction probability 1   p (t) = F (w   t)
decrease with the ring cost. For simplicity, we assume that E (y) w < c: no jobs are created when the
ring cost becomes arbitrarily large.
For later use we dene the following elasticities. The elasticity of the job-nding probability with
respect to the ring cost is given by
tm0 (t)
m (t)
=    ( (t))
1   ( (t))
tF (w   t)
 (w; t)
(8)
where  ()  0 () = () 2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of  with respect to . Similarly, the elasticity of the
job loss probability with respect to t is written
tp0 (t)
p (t)
=
tF 0 (w   t)
1  F (w   t) (9)
Housing market. The housing market imperfection is formalized as follows. If a worker is dismissed,
he defaults on the mortgage. In case of default, the bank (or the insurance company if the bank is
insured) only recoups a share 1    2 [0; 1] of the value that has been contracted. The parameter  is
the index of HMR. This cost is a pure loss for the economy. In this section, we analyze the demand for
EPL for a given .6 Finally, there is perfect competition between suppliers on the housing market.
Consider the mortgage case. We normalize the banks marginal cost of money to one. The marginal
return depends on the price paid by the borrower, the default probability 1   p, and the parameter .
With perfect competition on the banking sector, we have
1 = pR+ (1  p) (1  ) (10)
It follows that the mortgage price is
R = 1 + 
1  p
p
(11)
6 In subsection 4.5, we discuss the potential endogeneity of HMR.
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The price is increasing in , from 1 when  = 0 to 1=p when  = 1. It is also decreasing in p, as the price
is an increasing function of the default probability. This e¤ect is all the higher in so far as the distortion
 is signicant. The crucial point is that increasing job security lowers the mortgage price when the
housing market is regulated.
In the rental case, the interpretation of equations (10) and (11) is as follows: the marginal cost of
constructing a unit of housing is normalized to one, R is the rent, and 1    is the proportion of the
opportunity cost that can be refunded once the owner e¤ectively separates from the tenant who does not
pay the rent.
Individual preferences. Individuals are risk neutral. This assumption is made for two reasons. On the
one hand, our point is not related to optimal insurance design against income risk. On the other hand,
HMR originates a particular form of risk aversion that is easier to understand when agents are initially
risk neutral. The expected utility of the representative agent is:
U = mp
w
R
(12)
The product mp is the employment probability, while w=R is the real wage, that is the number of
units of housing consumption. The unemployed have no housing consumption.
The demand for EPL results from
t 2 argmax
t0

U (t) = m (t) p (t)
w
R (t)

(P1)
The maximization problem (P1) may admit a corner solution where t = 0. This may be so when
U 0 (0) < 0. If such a corner solution holds, individuals are reasonably happy with the working of the
labor and credit markets and do not demand further protection on the labor market. We assume that
U 0 (0) > 0 so that there is an interior solution to the maximization problem (P1). Such a solution results
from the following rst-order condition:
tp0 (t)
p (t)
+
 tR0 (t)R (t)
 =  tm0 (t)m (t)
 (13)
The right-hand side refers to the marginal cost of EPL, that is a lower job-nding probability. The
left-hand side refers to the marginal benet derived from EPL. It is composed of two terms. The rst
term is the return on job security: the stricter EPL, the lower the job-loss probability. The second term
is the return on housing price: an increase in job security lowers housing cost. In the absence of this
latter return, EPL would simply be chosen so as to maximize the employment probability.
We compute the elasticity of housing price with respect to EPL from (11):
tR0 (t)
R (t)
=   
+ (1  ) p (t)
tp0 (t)
p (t)
(14)
It is proportional to the elasticity of the probability of keeping ones job with respect to the EPL pa-
rameter. The (absolute value of the) factor of proportion increases with . Replacing (14) in (13), we
get:
tp0 (t)
p (t)

1 +

+ (1  ) p (t)

=
 tm0 (t)m (t)
 (15)
Using (8) and (9), and assuming that U 0 (0) > 0, optimal EPL t is implicitly dened by
tF 0 (w   t)
1  F (w   t)

1 +

+ (1  ) [1  F (w   t)]

=
 ( (t))
1   ( (t))
tF (w   t)
 (w   t) (16)
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Proposition 1 HMR and optimal job protection. Let t be unique with t > 0 and consider a
marginal increase in the degree of HMR . Then, (i) Optimal job protection t goes up, that is dt=d > 0,
and (ii) the equilibrium employment rate m(t)p(t) goes down, that is dm(t)p(t)=d < 0
HMR raises the net return on job security. Job security not only a¤ects welfare because it decreases
the probability of dismissal, it also reduces the housing cost. This second e¤ect is all the larger in so far
as the housing market is regulated. The e¤ect is nil when  = 0, while the total return on job security is
counted twice when  = 1. Therefore, the social demand for EPL increases with HMR.
Proposition 1 provides a local result. It does not state that EPL is globally increasing in HMR. If the
function U has several local maxima, large changes in  may induce a jump in optimal job protection.
Such a jump may either be upward or downward. When the jump is downward, optimal job protection
goes down with the degree of HMR. We dispose of such a pathological case by the requirement that t is
unique.
Proposition 1 has three implications.
On the positive side, the model rationalizes the positive correlation between HMRt 1 and EPLt
reported in section 2. The model suggests that observed EPL heterogeneity in the cross-section of OECD
countries may be partly explained by HMR heterogeneity across countries.
On the normative side, the model promotes a way to reform EPL. Policy makers should rst reform
the housing market. This would weaken the political support for employment protection, thereby making
the labor market reform easier. Our estimates show that HMR a¤ects EPL with a delay. Such a delay
means that Governments must change the housing market regulation far in advance prior to changing
the labor market legislation. This may not t with the political agenda.
Finally, individuals are willing to lower their job opportunities in exchange for a lower housing price.
Without HMR, EPL would simply maximize the employment probability e (t) = m (t) p (t). Assuming
an interior solution, optimal EPL would balance the marginal decrease in matching probability with the
marginal increase in job-keeping probability. Formally, when  = 0, we have e0 (t) = 0, which is equiv-
alent to tp0 (t) =p (t) = jtm0 (t) =m (t)j. With HMR, the marginal impact of EPL on employment
probability is negative, as agents account for the return on housing price. Indeed, the preferred EPL
parameter results from e0 (t) =e (t) = R0 (t) =R (t) < 0. This additional return on job security can
explain why nonemployed young individuals may be in favor of a very strict EPL that reduces the odds
of employment.
4 Discussions
We discuss several aspects of our model and some of its implications.
4.1 Family support and social housing
HMR causes a social demand for job protection. This is so because HMR creates risk aversion among
individuals who are initially risk neutral. However, families and friends on the one hand, and the State
on the other hand, typically provide housing for the deprived. In this subsection, we argue that such
types of insurance raise the returns to EPL.
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Assume that nonemployed individuals benet from some exogenous level of housing h0 < min
t
w=R (t).
This level may be provided by the family through living arrangements, or by some social housing policy.
We refer to h0 as nonmarket housing opportunities.
Ex-ante utility becomes
U (t) = m (t) p (t)
w
R (t)
+ [1 m (t) p (t)]h0 (17)
Assuming an interior solution, optimal EPL results from the following equality:
p0 (t)
p (t)

1  h0
w=R (t)

+
R0 (t)R (t)
 = m0 (t)m (t)
 1  h0w=R (t)

(18)
Proposition 2 Nonmarket housing opportunities and optimal job protection. Let t be
unique with t > 0 and consider a marginal increase in nonmarket housing opportunities h0. Then,
optimal strictness of EPL t goes up, that is dt=dh0 > 0.
Parameter h0 only a¤ects the return to EPL in terms of employment probability, while leaving the
return in terms of housing price una¤ected. On the one hand, nonmarket housing opportunities make
unemployment less painful, which reduces the employment return accordingly. On the other hand, this
type of insurance does not target the particular housing market failure induced by HMR. The return on
housing price stays unchanged as a result. It follows that the consideration of family support and social
housing magnies the distortion highlighted in this paper.
4.2 Housing unemployment insurance
Our model is based on the documented fact that unemployment episodes signicantly increase the prob-
ability of mortgage default, or at least mortgage delinquency. Lenders confronted with HMR reward job
security as a result. This phenomenon only arises because there is no housing unemployment insurance.
If the unemployed could sign complete contracts with such an insurance company, the insurance would
cover the workers default, and lenders would be indi¤erent vis-à-vis job security. In turn, the social
demand for job protection would decrease.
Housing unemployment insurance di¤ers from regular unemployment insurance. Regular unemploy-
ment insurance partly covers the loss of income. It is induced by risk aversion, which our model abstracts
from. In so far as insurance is incomplete, the default probability still exists. Indeed, workers can use
unemployment benets for various purposes, including mortgage payments, but also non-durable and
other durable consumption. Complete insurance cannot be provided for obvious moral hazard reasons.
In addition, young workers are generally unentitled to unemployment benets because they have not paid
taxes for su¢ ciently long. In other words, there is always room for housing unemployment insurance.
The market for private insurance on the rental market is virtually nonexistent. By contrast, mortgage
unemployment insurance does exist. In case of full insurance, the price of the loan is equal to the marginal
cost of money, i.e. R = 1. Such a price no longer depends on job security. A balanced budget requires
that the premium  paid by the worker be worth
 = (1  p)w (19)
14
This leads to the following maximum utility level
U (t) = m (t)
w   
r
= m (t) p(t)
w
r
(20)
Workersexpected utility does not depend on HMR. Full insurance implies that HMR does not alter the
demand for job protection.
However, there is evidence that mortgage unemployment insurance is incomplete. The literature
mostly focuses on UK data (see for instance Pryce and Keoghan, 2001, 2002) and highlights the fact that
high-risk workers are typically excluded from insurance coverage.7 Mortgage unemployment insurance
contracts do not allow bank exposure to default risk to be reduced. This is probably so for various
moral hazard problems that can be inferred from reading the insurance contracts: insurers want to avoid
workers voluntarily choosing to default, either through voluntary unemployment or rational default when
net equity becomes negative. In addition, unemployment risk, unlike other life risks, is heavily correlated
across individuals, which creates aggregate risk for the insurer.
Incomplete insurance on the mortgage market and missing insurance on the rental market originate a
demand for State-provided housing unemployment insurance. These policies reduce the political support
for job protection. States already provide regular unemployment insurance, but do not separately insure
borrowers against mortgage default. However, they may insure dwellers and pay the rent in case of
default. This is especially true for youth who are excluded from unemployment insurance coverage.
4.3 Short-term vs long-term jobs
Between the end-1980s and the 2000s, European labor markets became more exible via easier access to
short-term contracts. In this subsection, we consider two types of contracts, namely regular contracts or
long-term jobs and temporary contracts or short-term jobs. We argue that HMR can explain why people
want to set taxes on the use of short-term contracts even though such taxes lower their employment
probability.
For simplicity, we directly focus on a reduced-form model. The labor market part of the model extends
the basic model to dual jobs, and reproduces the salient features of Blanchard and Landier (2002). There
are two types of jobs, short-term and long-term, index by ST and LT . Contracts di¤er in job security,
with pST the probability of keeping a short-term job and pLT the probability of keeping a long-term job,
with pLT > pST .8 There is a tax  on the use of short-term jobs. This tax has two e¤ects. On the one
hand, it reduces the matching probability m = m (). When  increases, rms create fewer jobs and
become more selective at the time of interview. On the other hand, it increases the proportion q = q ()
of long-term jobs amongst total employment. Firms o¤er long-term jobs more frequently.
As banks can observe the employment contract, they o¤er two di¤erent mortgages. The loan price
for workers in a contract of type i = ST;LT is
Ri = 1 + 
1  pi
pi
(21)
7Typical mortgage unemployment insurance contracts are only proposed to experienced (not-too-old) employees under
a regular contract, feature an explicit period over which the worker is not covered, and allow payments to be delayed in
case of delinquency rather than the insurance company substitutes for defaulting individuals.
8For a micro foundation of this setting see Blanchard and Landier (2002).
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Individuals in a short-term job pay a higher price than individuals in a long-term job. In the particular
case where there are no housing market imperfections, the loan price does not depend on job security
and RST = RLT = 1.
The preferred tax  is dened by
 2 argmax
0
m ()

q () pLT
w
RLT
+ (1  q ()) pST w
RST

(22)
There may be a corner solution where  = 0. In that case, individuals do not want to regulate the use
of short-term contracts. In an interior solution, the preferred tax results from the f.o.c.:
m0 ()
m ()

1 +
1  q ()
q ()
pST
pLT
RLT
RST

=
q0 ()
q ()

1  pST
pLT
RLT
RST

(23)
The marginal cost of the tax consists of a lower matching probability weighted by the average matching
gain. The marginal benet consists of a larger probability of having a long-term job. This gain is all the
higher in so far as job security di¤ers between contracts.
Proposition 3 HMR and short-term contract taxation. Let  be unique with  > 0 and
consider a marginal increase in the degree  of HMR. Then, (i) the preferred tax on short-term contracts
goes up, that is d=d > 0, and (ii) the employment rate goes down, that is de=d < 0.
Without HMR, the only purpose of the tax  is to maximize the employment probability. Although
one may doubt that a positive tax could be e¢ cient in that case, Blanchard and Landier argue that the
gain in mean job security due to the increase in the proportion of o¤ered long-term jobs can o¤set the loss
in matching probability. Although the reduced-form model we use here is compatible with the Blanchard
and Landier thesis, consideration of HMR strengthens the view thereby young people do not want jobs
that increase the overall labor market risk. Housing market imperfections reduce the marginal cost of
the tax and raise its marginal benet. On the one hand, an increase in  raises the mortgage price. The
real wage goes down as a result, which lowers the cost of the tax in terms of employment probability. On
the other hand, an increase in  magnies the gap between RST and RLT . Regular jobs become more
attractive as a result.
Consequently, the preferred tax can be higher than the one that maximizes employment. Furthermore,
the tax increases with the degree of HMR. Therefore, our model can help to understand why people
are willing to tax the use of temporary jobs beyond the level that maximizes the odds of employment.
Several European Governments have facilitated the use of temporary contracts over the past two decades,
resulting in millions of jobs for European workers. However, such Governments were not systematically
reelected, suggesting that people were dissatised with the new jobs.9
4.4 Down-payment restrictions
The basic model focuses on housing market distortions that increase the cost of foreclosure. Such dis-
tortions raise the return to job security as workers benet from better loans. However, this mechanism
presumes that individuals get access to the credit market. In this subsection, we analyze the e¤ects of
legislation that limits access to housing credit. We name the bulk of such legislation min down-payment
9See Boeri (2008).
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policies as it mostly increases the ratio of minimum down payment to value. We argue that such policies
tend to lower support for job protection.
To introduce a min down-payment policy, households must be endowed with wealth to invest. Here-
after, we consider a particular individual whose wealth is I. Let  denote the minimum down-payment
ratio. The mortgage E cannot exceed the fraction  of the total purchased value, that is E= (E + I)  ,
which is equivalent to E  1  I.
Wealth endowments, even without down-payment requirements, impact the household borrowing cost.
For a given mortgage E, the bank takes less risk with a wealthy borrower as, in case of foreclosure, the
value recovered by the bank is minf(1   )(E + I); w). Therefore, the bank exposure to risk goes down
to zero when the wealth of the agent covers the possible foreclosure losses, that is. when I > E + w(1 ) .
Let Eb denote the maximum amount a bank is willing to lend to an individual with wealth I and
wage w. We have
Eb = pw + (1  p)minf(1  )(Eb + I); wg (24)
Therefore,
Eb = Eb (t; I; ) =
(
1
r
pw+(1 p)(1 )I
p+(1 p) if I  Ib
w if I > Ib
(25)
with Ib = w= (1  ) the threshold above which the bank considers the household to be a risk-free
borrower.
Due to the min down-payment policy, the household may not be able to borrow the maximum amount
that the bank is willing to lend. The maximum mortgage is now dened by E = min

Eb; I (1  ) =	.
The preferred EPL parameter results from
t (I; ; ) 2 argmax
t0
m (t) p (t)min

Eb (t; I; ) + I; I=
	
(26)
We study the solution to the maximization problem in two steps. First, we focus on the unconstrained
solution, that is the preferred EPL parameter if the min down-payment policy did not exist. Second, we
focus on the constrained solution and conclude.
Let t  0 denote the employment-maximizer EPL parameter. In an interior solution, the preferred
EPL parameter tb solves:
tbp0
 
tb

p (tb)

1 + "
 
tb; I; 

=
 tbm0
 
tb

m (tb)
 (27)
where " is the elasticity of maximum housing spending vis-à-vis the probability of mortgage reimbursement
p. This elasticity is dened by
" (t; I; ) =
(
w I(1 )
(I+pw)(p+(1 p)) if I  Ib
0 if I > Ib
(28)
As " is decreasing in I, tb decreases with individual wealth, reaching t when I = Ib. HMR increases
the demand for job protection among individuals whose wealth is lower than Ib as " (t; I; ) is increasing
in  for those values of I:
Now, consider the constrained solution td. When banks are constrained, a decrease in t does not a¤ect
the housing consumption of the consumer but does increase their likelihood of being employed as long as
t > t: The EPL parameter is set so as to make Eb+ I and I= equal. Two cases must be distinguished.
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When   , the min down-payment policy is restrictive compared to the housing market imperfection.
The maximum amount that banks are willing to lend is always larger than the maximum amount induced
by the law. The optimal EPL parameter td = t in that case and individuals enjoy I= units of housing
consumption. When  > , using (25), tb is unique and solves
p
 
td

=
(  ) I
w   (1  ) I (29)
The parameter td is increasing in I and goes from td < 0 when I = 0 to innity when I = w 1  . Note
also that td is increasing in both  and  as long as  >  and I < w 1  .
The preferred EPL parameter follows. When   , individuals borrow less than the banks would
like to lend and t (I; ; ) = t. When  > , individuals may be constrained or not by the min
down-payment policy. Then,
t (I; ; ) =
8>><>>:
t if I  I or I  Ib
td (I; ; ) if I 2  I; I
tb (I; ) if I 2 I; Ib
with I such that td
 
I; ; 

= tb
 
I; ; 

.
Proposition 4 Wealth and optimal job protection (i) When the down-payment ratio is larger
than the degree of HMR,  < ; all individuals prefer the employment-maximizer EPL parameter t.
(ii) When the down-payment ratio is lower than the degree of HMR,  > ; individuals endowed with low
or high wealth prefer t while individuals in the middle of the wealth distribution prefer more protected
jobs. Preferred EPL is rst increasing and then decreasing in wealth endowment.
Individuals do not need excess job protection when   , that is when the min down-payment policy
is stricter than the degree of housing market imperfection. The case  >  is depicted by Figure 5. The
locus td corresponds to constrained individuals whose best EPL parameter binds the min down-payment
policy. The locus tb corresponds to unconstrained individuals who prefer an interior solution. Optimal
EPL is rst increasing, then decreasing in wealth. Neither poor nor rich individuals require extra job
protection. The rich invest so much collateral that they are risk-free borrowers whatever the degree of
job protection. The poor have too little collateral to invest and cannot expand their credit opportunities
through additional job security. As wealth increases, individuals can relax the constraint imposed by
the min down-payment policy and the preferred EPL parameter rises. Above I, individuals are not
constrained and the demand for EPL decreases with wealth.
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t
I
tb td
IbI I
d > 0
d > 0d > 0
d = 0
 I
Figure 2: Optimal job protection as a function of individual wealth with min down-payment policy
Case  > . The preferred EPL parameter is depicted by the thick line
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The e¤ects of HMR and min-down payment policies can be described as follows.
Proposition 5 Down payment, HMR and job protection (i) When  < ; neither  nor  have
an impact on EPL. (ii) When  > ; a marginal increase in  reduces the set of constrained individuals
and lowers the preferred EPL parameter among such individuals, while a marginal increase in  expands
the set of individuals who need extra job protection, and increases the preferred EPL parameter among
constrained and unconstrained individuals.
Proof. The results follow from comparative statics on td and tb:
Proposition 5 tells a general message: the demand for job protection increases with the degree of
HMR in countries where mortgage credit is available. When the law restricts access to mortgage credit,
there are no possibilities to expand credit opportunities with more secure jobs. Then, optimal EPL only
corrects failures specic to the labor market, and deregulating the housing market has no impact on the
social demand for job protection.
The scope for policy complementarity depends on the strictness of min down-payment policies. Figure
3 confronts the min down-payment ratio (latest data available) with the administrative cost of foreclosure
(in percentage of the mortgaged house). The min down-payment ratio is on the x-axis, while the measure
of housing market imperfection is on the y-axis. Figure 3 features two additional axes whose origin is
dened by the median values of the depicted variables. The countries that are the most exposed to policy
complementarity are located in the North-East part, while, conversely, the countries that are the least
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exposed to policy complementarity are located in the South-West part.
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Figure 3: Administrative cost of foreclosure and min down-payment
ratio. Source: legal expenses (in % of property value) are from Chiuri and
Japelli (2003); the min down-payment ratio is from Lo Prete (2008)
Figure 3 displays two remarkable features.
First, the min down-payment ratio is low in our sample of countries. It never exceeds 20%, and it
is frequently negative, meaning that banks can lend more than the value of the house (either to nance
regular consumption or to nance investments that may improve the value of the house). These weak
values of the min down-payment ratio result from the nancial market deregulation observed in the 1990s.
In terms of Proposition 5, this means that  is small, which opens the room for the relationship between
EPL and HMR.
Second, the countries that are the most exposed to policy complementarity are Belgium, France,
Spain, and more surprisingly the Netherlands. By contrast, rst-time buyers do not easily have access to
mortgage credit in Germany and Italy, while legal expenses of foreclosure seem too low in the UK.
4.5 Feed-back e¤ects from EPL to HMR
The parameter  measures the distortions induced by HMR. Most of these distortions depend on the
characteristics of the judicial system, as with its legal origins, the degree of law enforcement, or spendings
in the correct functioning of the system. Some of the distortions are also induced by the legal protection
that accrues to borrowers against lenders and to renters against landlords. We now focus on the demand
for such a protection.
We make two changes. On the one hand, workers are partially insured against the default risk. The
parameter " denotes the fraction of the good that the worker can enjoy when s/he defaults. This fraction
obtains at some cost, as " increases distortions. Therefore,  =  ("), with  (0)  0, so that " is not the
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only source of distortion. In addition, there is no free lunch and 0 (")  1. What the worker gets is lost
for the bank. Actually, the loss can be larger due to legal procedures and delays. Finally, we assume that
the size of the distortions increases with the level of insurance coverage and 00 (") > 0. As an example,
we consider that  (") = 0 exp ("), with 0 < 1 and 0  1. The parameters 0 and  are induced by
the fundamental properties of the judicial system.
On the other hand, we account for additional default risks. With probability 1 , the worker defaults
when s/he has a job. The worker keeps the proportion " of the good when such a default occurs. S/he
obtains the proportion " when the default happens while the worker is unemployed. The parameter 
accounts for the potential bias of judges when the person who makes default is unemployed. This bias
can be positive ( > 1), or negative ( < 1).
The mortgage price R must account for the two sources of mortgage default. We obtain R = 1 +
 (") (1  p) =p. It is increasing in the distortion . Therefore, it increases with workers degree of
housing insurance ". It is also decreasing in workers probability p of keeping the job, as it reduces the
overall default probability.
The preferred degree of housing protection results from
max
"0
U = m [p ( + "(1  )) + (1  p)"] w
R (")
(30)
The term [p ( + "(1  )) + (1  p)"] is the ex-ante probability of housing enjoyment. It is increasing
in the degree of housing insurance ". However, " increases the mortgage price R, thereby reducing the
amount of housing consumption.
The rst derivative of U with respect to " has the sign of
g (") = 
(1  p) + p(1  )
p
(1  
0"

)  (1  ) 1  p
1  p   (
0   1) (31)
This sign can be positive or negative reecting the antagonistic impacts of " on housing enjoyment
probability and amount of housing consumption.
An increase in job security modies the marginal return to " as follows:
sign(gp) = sign
(
 

1  
0"


+ (1  ) 1  


p
1  p
2)
(32)
The rst term is due to the marginal impact of p on the probability of housing enjoyment. The second
term results from the fact that p increases the expected amount of housing consumption, thereby raising
the return to housing insurance. The global e¤ect is ambiguous. Job security, therefore, has an ambiguous
impact on the social demand for housing insurance.
To go a step further, we focus on the particular case where  (v) = 0 exp ("). Solving the rst-order
condition to the maximization problem gives:
(") =
p
1  p
(1  p) + p(1  )
(   1) + p((   1)(1  ) +  (33)
The function  (") is rst increasing and then decreasing in p. However, there is an interior solution
when  (") 2 [0; 1]. To illustrate the property of non-monotonicity, we consider a parameterization.
The parameter  = :95 and employed workers only have a small default probability. The parameter  = 3
and unemployed persons are better covered than employed individuals. The parameter 0 = :25, which
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sizes distortions in the absence of housing insurance. The parameter  = 4, which gives the elasticity of
the distortion with respect to housing insurance.
Figure 4.5 plots " as a function of p.
Optimal housing insurance " as a function of job security p. The set of parameters is  = 3,  = :95,
 = 1=0, and 0 = :25.
There is no demand for housing insurance when job security is low. The expected amount of housing
consumption w=R is so low that workers do not nd it useful to increase the distortion  in order to
be insured against the default risk. As p becomes larger, the magnitude of optimal housing insurance
increases. It is at most equal to 15% for a job loss probability around 8%. The distortion  reaches
.45, 20 percentage points higher than the level without housing insurance. Finally, optimal insurance
decreases with job security, reecting the fact that job security lowers the need for housing insurance.
4.6 Back to the French CPE events: mismatch in policy reforms
France is a good case study for our theory. International comparisons show that the housing market is
highly regulated, the minimum down-payment ratio is low, regular jobs benet from strict legislation,
there are many short-term jobs, and youth are typically excluded from unemployment insurance. France
experienced two policy reforms in 2006. On the labor market, a new contract was created. As explained
in the introduction, the CPE mostly involved a regular job with an extended probation period. In terms
of the models developed so far, the CPE can be analyzed as a reduction in job security, either through
a decline in the EPL parameter t, or a fall in the short-term job tax  . On the rental market, the
generosity of a public insurance against dwellers default was increased. This policy corresponds to a
decline in parameter . Joint policy reform is exactly the type of policy we advertise in this paper.
Unfortunately, the housing market reform took place months after the failure of the labor market reform,
rather than before it or at the same time.
The rental market is highly regulated in France. Rents cannot easily change, typical contracts (baux )
between the owner and the tenant last three years, and tenants cannot be evicted during the six-month
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winter season. Owners are encouraged to screen the applicants as a result, and there is evidence of low
occupancy rates. To remedy the situation, the LocaPass program was created in 1998. This program is
nanced by employerscontributions on the total wage bill. The program has two main branches. The
Avance Locapass pays the collateral asked by owners prior to renting. The money must be refunded
within 36 months (the duration of the bail). The Garantie Locapass is a free insurance against renters
default. The State commits to pay at most 18 months over the 36 months of the bail of a rent contract.
The tenant should repay the debt whenever possible. The insurance contract cannot be renewed. All
employed tenants were initially covered. The insurance became available to students in 2001.
The labor market reform took place in two steps. In August 2005, the Contrat Nouvelle Embauche
was born. This contract was a regular contract with an extended probation period (from 6 months to two
years), only available in small rms (less than 20 employees), and allowed employers to re the workers
under probation without formal motives. In January 2006, the Contrat Première Embauche followed.
This contract was specic to those under 26 of age, and generalized the CNE to all rms. Youth started
to demonstrate in March, and many faculties were closed during two weeks. The CPE was stopped in
April 2006. After judicial battles concerning the duration of the probation period and the possibility for
employers to re without justication, the CNE o¢ cially disappeared in 2008.
The LocaPass program was reformed in December 2006, well after the CPE was abandoned. First,
entitlement criteria to Garantie LocaPass became less strict, allowing all employed persons under 30,
including students under temporary contracts, and unemployed under 30, to benet from the coverage.
Second, a new insurance contract was created, the Pass-GRL. This contract is sold by private insurers.
Owners pay a monthly premium amounting to 1.5 to 2.5% of the rent. The premium can be partly
deduced from income tax. In exchange, there is a no-limit guarantee against the tenants default. The
insurance also covers damages incurred by the dwelling.
The point here is that the housing market reform took place after the failure of the labor market
reform. Such a mismatch in policy reform should be avoided in the future.
5 Conclusion
This paper is about one fact and a possible explanation. The fact is the correlation between the degree
of Housing Market Regulation (HMR) and the strictness of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL).
The explanation is that HMR weakens lendersand ownersproperty rights, which in turn motivates the
demand for job protection.
We show that the two sets of regulations are positively correlated in the cross-section of OECD
countries. Using dynamic panel data for 15 countries over 1970-2000, we also show that the correlation
holds within countries, and is robust to the consideration of an autoregressive component in the dynamic
process of EPL. We then present a model in which the degree of HMR determines foreclosure costs on
the housing market, while the strictness of EPL sizes administrative costs of dismissals. Banks respond
to HMR by conditioning mortgage prices on job security. In that context, job protection is a second-best
way to lower the mortgage price and facilitates access to housing. Finally, we consider various extensions
that illustrate the usefulness of the basic model. Among them, we discuss the e¤ects of other types of
regulations that limit access to housing credit, and we explain why nonemployed individuals may favor a
tax on short-term contracts despite the fact that it lowers their employment probability.
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Reforming the labor market is not an easy task. Most European countries have chosen to facilitate
the use of temporary contracts rather than weakening the protection on regular contracts. These policies
are not popular in countries where the housing market is highly regulated. The reform would be easier if
the housing market were reformed rst. Typical reforms would reestablish lendersand ownersproperty
rights. For instance, the State could provide compulsory mortgage and rental insurance. This type of
insurance would come at a cost, but would also considerably lower the social demand for job security. In
this perspective, the failure of the 2006 French reform of employment contracts is illuminating. A reform
of the housing market took place months after the end of the law proposal.
Our paper could be extended in various directions. First, the model is very tractable, but it is too
simple to analyze complicated reforms, dynamic e¤ects, or to discuss the relationship between age and
preferred job protection. Second, the model takes HMR as given. It would be interesting to go beyond our
short discussion of the feed-back e¤ects of HMR on EPL. Finally, we would like to test the microeconomic
implications of the theory on individual data.
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APPENDIX
A Endogenous wages
In this Appendix, we examine the case of endogenous wages.
The contract space has the following restrictions. First, wages are set before the idiosyncratic shock,
and they cannot be changed once the shock is known. Second, the contract cannot stipulate any payment
from the rm to the worker in case of separation. This restriction implicitly results from out-of-model
moral hazard problems. Third, the rm cannot credibly commit not to re the worker in case of adverse
productivity shock. The contract space is, therefore, incomplete, which may originate a demand for
employment protection even though agents are risk neutral.
The wage may depend on EPL, i.e. w = w (t). In such a case, the general reasoning remains una¤ected
provided that
  F (w (t)  t)
1  F (w (t)  t) < w
0 (t) < 1, for all t (34)
These restrictions ensure that m0 (t) < 0 and p0 (t) > 0. The social demand for EPL results from
mw
m
w0 +
mt
m
+
p0
p
  p
0
p
w0 +
w0
w
  R
0
R
+
R0
R
w0 = 0 (35)
where m = m (w (t) ; t), w0 = w0 (t), p = p (t  w (t)) = 1   F (w (t)  t), and R = R (t  w (t)). Using
the fact that
mw (w; t)
m (w; t)
=
1  F (w (t)  t)
F (w (t)  t)
mt (w; t)
m (w; t)
(36)
and
R0 (t  w (t))
R (t  w (t)) =  

+ (1  ) p (t  w (t))
p0 (t  w (t))
p (t  w (t)) (37)
We nally obtain
tp0
p

1 +

+ (1  ) p (t  w (t))

(1  w0) + tw
0
w
=
 tmtm
 1 + 1  FF w0

(38)
However, there is another di¢ culty with endogenous wages: depending on the wage setting, the wage
may depend on HMR index . Suppose that the wage results from Nash bargaining over expected match
surplus, i.e.
w (t) 2 argmax
w

Z (w; t) =  ln

p (w; t)
w
R (w; t)

+ (1  ) ln (w; t)

(39)
where  2 (0; 1) is workers bargaining power. This case is slightly more di¢ cult to analyze, because (i)
the wage alters the mortgage price R, and (ii) the index of HMR  also a¤ects R, thereby changing the
bargained wage.
Note that Z (0; t) is minus innity. In addition, there is a unique w+ (t) such that  (w; t)  0 i¤
w  w+ (t). It follows that the rst-order condition is necessary and the bargained wage w (t) 2 (0; w+ (t))
satises

 (w; t)
1  F (w   t) = (1  )
w
1 + wpw(w;t)p(w;t)   wRw(w;t)R(w;t)
(40)
Noting that
wRw (w; t)
R (w; t)
=   
+ (1  ) p (w; t)
wpw (w; t)
p (w; t)
(41)
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we nally get
w (t) =
A (w (t) ; t)
1   + A (w (t) ; t)

E (y j y  w (t)  t)  F (w (t)  t)
1  F (w (t)  t) t

(42)
with
A (w; t) = 1 +

+ (1  ) p (w; t)
wpw (w; t)
p (w; t)
< 1 (43)
This wage rule features two important properties. First, the wage is a share of average output net of
expected ring costs. Second, the bargained wage is decreasing in , the index of HMR, which raises the
mortgage price. Indeed, increasing the wage deteriorates the probability of keeping ones job. This has a
direct e¤ect on workers utility through the decline in probability of enjoying housing consumption. But,
there is also an indirect e¤ect whereby there is a further increase in the price that banks charge due to
the rise in default probability.
The social demand for EPL still results from (38). The di¤erence now is that changes in  have
complicated e¤ects on the marginal cost and benet derived from EPL. However, all these new e¤ects
are second-order e¤ects due to the positive impact of  on the loan price R that deteriorates the wage
w. They should be dominated by the rst-order e¤ect of  on the return to job security that is discussed
throughout the paper.
B Proof of Proposition 1
(i) The prot function  (w; t) is strictly decreasing in t, with  (w; 0) > c and lim
t!1 (w; t) =
R1
 1 (y   w) dF (y) =
E (y)   w < c. It follows that there is a unique t+ such that  (w; t+) = c. The di¤erent assumptions
on the matching technology implies that  (t+) = 0, so that m (t) = 0 for all t  t+. It follows that
U (t) > U (t+) for all t < t+.
Now, let the function  : [0; t+] [0; 1] be such that
 (t; ) =    ( (t))
1   ( (t))
F (w   t)
 (w   t) +
F 0 (w   t)
1  F (w   t)

1 +
 [1  F (w   t)]
1  +  [1  F (w   t)]

(44)
By assumption, the f.o.c. to the maximization program (P1) is necessary. We have
Ut (t
; ) = U (t; ) (t; ) = 0 (45)
which is equivalent to  (t; ) = 0. This gives equation (16).
We have Utt (t; ) < 0 by denition of a maximum. But, Utt (t; ) = U (t; ) t (t
; ), which
implies that  t (t
; ) < 0. Applying the implicit function theorem to the f.o.c. we obtain
dt
d
=    (t
; )
 t (t
; )
(46)
which has the sign of   (t
; ). But,
  (t; ) =
F 0 (w   t)
f1  +  [1  F (w   t)]g2 > 0 (47)
The result follows.
(ii) The employment probability induced by the preferred EPL parameter is e (t) = m (t) p (t).
The marginal impact of the degree of HMR  results from e0 (t) dt=d. We know from part (i) that
dt=d > 0. Therefore, the change in employment probability has the sign of e0 (t). When t > 0, we
have e0 (t) =e (t) = R0 (t) =R (t) < 0.
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C Other proofs
The proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 are very similar to the proof of Proposition 1. The proofs of Propo-
sitions 4 to 6 are given in the body of the text.
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